Year of Publication
International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS)
Many types of attacks on confidentiality stem from the non- deterministic nature of the environment that computer programs operate in (e.g., schedulers and asynchronous communication channels). In this paper, we focus on verification of confidentiality in nondeterministic environments by reasoning about asynchronous hyperproperties. First, we generalize the temporal logic A-HLTL to allow nested trajectory quantification, where a trajectory determines how different execution traces may advance and stutter. We propose a bounded model checking algorithm for A-HLTL based on QBF-solving for a fragment of the generalized A-HLTL and evaluate it by various case studies on concurrent programs, schedul- ing attacks, compiler optimization, speculative execution, and cache timing attacks. We also rigorously analyze the complexity of model checking for different fragments of A-HLTL.